September (August), 1812
(From P.A.Zhilin "The Patriotic War Of 1812", Moscow,1988)
At daybreak of September 8th,1812, the main forces of the Russian army had left the Borodino field and were retreating along the road to the town of Mozhaisk. The Russian rear-guard was beginning to withdraw. No one seemed to pursue them and they stopped overnight at Zhukovo Village.
 Admiral Chichagov (Tchichagov) |
In the evening the French vanguard approached Mozhaisk. Murat was ordered to capture the town and then to move eastwards from it. But the Russian rear-guard (Platov's cossacks) offered stubborn resistance and held Mozhaisk until the next morning, allowing enough time to carry out wounded soldiers and reserves. Murat's forces and the Young Guards efforts to take the town was unsuccessful.
Segur wrote:
"When coming to Mozhaisk, Murat thought the town was already in his control and sent a message to the Emperor inviting him to stay with him there, overnight, but he found that the Russian rear-guard had fortified its positions at the walls of the town, and the main Russian forces were disposed behind it. They had cut the roads to Moscow and Kaluga". (1)The Russians appeared as firm and decisive as they had before the Borodino battle, but Murat with his usual "lightness" rushed them. This turned into a long and fierce fight, and Murat suffered losses even bigger and more terrible than before" (2)
The next day, the Russian rear-guard withdrew from Mozhaisk and stopped near the town on the hills where the main Russian forces had stayed before. Here, the troops of rear-guard received reinforcements, and Kutuzov appointed General Miloradovich to command them.
The Borodino battle did not decide the outcome of the whole campaign. The Russians had to retreat to Moscow, but Kutuzov was firmly determined to defeat the Napoleonic army. All his efforts were to achieve this goal.
"It is not about the glory of won battles" he wrote in one of his reports to the Tsar, "but the main goal is annihilation the French army, I have therefore made the decision to retreat." (3) . "I won the battle before Moscow, but I must save the army."
"Shortly, our whole army, including Tormasov, Chichagov, Wittgenstein and others will act for a single purpose, and Napoleon will be unable to stay long in Moscow." (4) .
These words has a serious meaning: Kutuzov did not get reserves and could not make the 3rd Danubian army to turn in the right direction, so he made the single right decision under those conditions: to retreat and save the army, to summons strength and then, to take the counter-offensive and defeat the enemy.
The Russian army withdrew over the Nara River to Krutitsy village, and Miloradovich spent the whole day repulsing Murat's stubborn attacks against the Russian positions near the village of Krimskoe. Murat was thrown back with big losses, and his movement was stopped for almost two days.
The Russian army calmly retreated to Moscow in full order along its scheduled route. They marched from Borodino to Moscow in six days and nights.
Murat had received a telling blow at Mozhaisk and Krimskoe, and did not try to attack the Russian rear-guard. The reason of it was not Murat's indecision and passiveness. On the contrary, the King of Naples was a genuine hothead,always ready to attack any enemy as his Emperor might order. But after the Borodino battle the French were weaker than the Russian army. The cause of the French army's irresolute actions was the great losses they suffered at Borodino. It was especially felt in the Cavalry, the most mobile troops, for without them, it was impossible for Napoleon to pursue the Russian army.
The remaining cavalry was exhausted. Once, when Murat expressed his dissatisfaction with the cavalry to Nansouty, he was told, "It is because of our horses have no patriotism. Our soldiers fight very well without bread, but horses do not want to attend to their duties without oats" (5).
The organization of the march/manoeuvre from Borodino to Moscow is interesting: The first day the Russian troops withdrew beyond Mozhaisk in four columns.
The first column consisted of the troops of the 2nd army (General Dokhturov), the 2nd and the 3rd Infantry Corps. It moved along the Old Smolensk road.
The second column, the 4th and 6th Infantry Corps (General Miloradovich), moved along the right side of the New Smolensk road.
The third column consisted of artillery and traveled the New Smolensk road.
The fourth column, the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Corps, went along the left side of the New Smolensk road.(6)
The previous four marches were made by the army in three columns. The movement of the troops always began at midnight. All the artillery went along the Old Smolensk road; on the right side of it went the troops of the 2nd army, the 4th and the 6th Infantry Corps, and on the left side moved the rest of the troops, the 1st army.
Part of the Cavalry went before each column, the balance followed behind the columns. (7)
The Russian army, with more than 600 artillery guns, numerous transports, carriages with wounded and other cargo, made its retreat in perfect order. Even the French said the Russian army did not look and act as an army that had been in terrible battle only a few hours before: the French, following the retreating Russians, found no discarded materials as usually dropped by troops retreating in disarray One of the most important organizational features of the Russian army retreat was the strong rear-guard that was able to safely cover the main units. When they withdrew from Tsarevo-Zaimishe village, the composite rear-guard of the 1st and 2nd armies, under the command of Lieutenant-General Konovnitsyn was formed. This included some large forces: the whole 3rd Infantry Division, six Jager (Chasseur) regiments, two hussar regiments, two artillery companies from the 1st army, three Jager regiments, two hussar regiments, and several Cossack regiments of General Platov from the 2nd army.
And when withdrawing from Mozhaisk to Moscow, the Russian army had an even stronger rear-guard. After Mozhaisk the rear-guard was under the command of General Miloradovich and included two Cavalry Corps and 10 Cossack regiments. These forces delivered telling blows to Murat's cavalry continuously, forcing it to back off several times.
The Russian command appraised highly the actions of the rear-guard troops that covered the smooth-running withdrawal of the 1st and the 2nd Western armies. Success in covering the main forces favored the regular army withdrawal to save troops.
Retreating deep into the Russian territory Kutuzov realized that the indispensable condition for taking the offensive would be to outnumber the enemy and to have enough large forces in reserve for future action. And while the French army suffered very severe losses in the Borodino battle, and the alignment of forces afterwards was in favor of the Russian army, it was most important that the French lacked the resources to quickly increase the size of their army. It was also evident that to enter a new bloody battle at this time for Moscow was too risky. It was necessary to sacrifice Moscow.
- "The March to Moscow in 1812 " The memoirs of a participant, French General Count de Segur. Moscow,1911,p.46
- The same, p.44
- M.I.Kutuzov, Volume,4, part 1, p.158
- "The Russian Invalid"., 1858, N64, p.272
- Liprandi I.P. "Who did win at Borodino?", Moscow,1867,p.140
- M.I.Kutuzov: Collection of documents, Moscow,1954, Volume 4, part 1,p.156
- The same, p.159
